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Abstract
Machine Learning approaches to Natural Language Processing
tasks benefit from a comprehensive collection of real-life user
data. At the same time, there is a clear need for protecting the
privacy of the users whose data is collected and processed. For
text collections, such as, e.g., transcripts of voice interactions
or patient records, replacing sensitive parts with benign alterna-
tives can provide de-identification. However, how much privacy
is actually guaranteed by such text transformations, and are the
resulting texts still useful for machine learning?
In this paper, we derive formal privacy guarantees for gen-
eral text transformation-based de-identification methods on the
basis of Differential Privacy.
We also measure the effect that different ways of mask-
ing private information in dialog transcripts have on a subse-
quent machine learning task. To this end, we formulate different
masking strategies and compare their privacy-utility trade-offs.
In particular, we compare a simple redact approach with more
sophisticated word-by-word replacement using deep learning
models on multiple natural language understanding tasks like
named entity recognition, intent detection, and dialog act classi-
fication. We find that only word-by-word replacement is robust
against performance drops in various tasks.
Index Terms: Differential privacy, Spoken language under-
standing, Named entity recognition, Intent detection.
1. Introduction
Machine learning approaches, in particular Deep Learning,
dominate many areas of Natural Language Processing (NLP).
To reach peak performance, they require large data sets to train
models. It is thus common to continuously collect user data
after a model has been deployed in order to augment existing
training data. This practice raises a clear need for protecting
the privacy of the users whose data are collected. For instance,
commercial providers of voice assistants have been criticized
for recording and transcribing conversations of their users1. But
other domains are affected as well, for instance, patients’ health
records in medical applications.
For text collections, one way to respect the users’ privacy
is to sanitize each document through a de-identification process
before adding it to a data collection. De-identification requires
to either delete all sensitive information in a text, or to replace it
with benign surrogates. Arguably, strict deletion is the less de-
sirable option because without an indication of where the edit
was made, texts can become impossible to understand or, per-
haps worse, change their meaning. To illustrate, consider the
following example from the medical domain, where the names
of specific medications are considered sensitive information:
1https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-
04-10/is-anyone-listening-to-you-on-alexa-a-
global-team-reviews-audio
(1) Besides warfarin, the patient is not taking any medica-
tion.
(2) Besides, the patient is not taking any medication .
A more commonly used alternative to deletion is redaction,
where relevant text portions are blackened rather than deleted,
but this can still impact readability. For instance, when dates,
times, and locations are considered sensitive with respect to a
person’s whereabouts, a sentence such as (3) would be rather
useless in a text corpus in its redacted form (4):
(3) How about Rick’s Cafe´ around noon on the 15th ?
(4) How about around on ?
This example illustrates that de-identification can imply a trade-
off between privacy and utility. In order to gauge the latter, Tang
et al. measure the impact of three alternative methods for mask-
ing sensitive words on a subsequent machine learning task [1].
The methods consist of two different ways of replacing words
with other, randomly selected words from the same category,
and of a method for replacing words with a specific category
marker. Applying these strategies to the previous example could
lead e.g. to the sentences in (5) and (6) respectively:
(5) How about London around 4 o’clock on the 3rd of May ?
(6) How about<LOCATION> around<TIME> on<DATE>?
However, Tang et al. [1] do not give any formal privacy guaran-
tees for their methods, making it difficult to judge the privacy-
utility trade-off.
In this paper, we fill this gap by deriving formal pri-
vacy guarantees for general text transformation-based de-
identification methods on the basis of Differential Privacy, a
well-established framework for quantifying privacy leakage [2].
In addition, we show the impact of five different text transfor-
mation strategies on three common NLP tasks, when the trans-
formed texts are used as training data for machine learning ap-
proaches. Unlike Tang et al., we perform our experiments on
six different corpora to gain more balanced evidence.
2. Related Work
Text de-identification, also known as sanitization, is well es-
tablished in highly sensitive domains, such as e.g., for patient
health records [3]. A large number of de-identification methods
have been suggested in that area in the past e.g. [4, 5, 6]. While
such methods are important for a number of domains, we focus
here on the privacy issues associated with cloud-based dialog
systems, such as e.g. [7], which are generally acknowledged
(e.g. [8]) but have not yet received wide-spread attention.
In contrast, the necessity for protecting private information
has long been realized in the data mining community [8]. Our
task is, however, quite different from data mining. For instance,
data mining transformations oftentimes pay special attention to
the preservation of certain statistical properties of the under-
lying data, which is not a primary concern in our work, thus
allowing us to explore simpler approaches.
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Probably the closest work to ours is [1] where the impact
of data sanitization has been investigated on Automatic Speech
Recognition (ASR) and call classification tasks. It has been
shown there that the spoken dialog system trained on sanitized
data achieves a comparable accuracy. In contrast, we apply text
replacement to Natural Language Understanding (NLU) tasks
and show that some replacement strategies can have a large de-
structive effect on the performance of the model. We verify this
by applying a state-of-the-art deep learning model to train the
NLU tasks by fine-tuning BERT [9] embeddings on three tasks
that include named entity recognition, intent detection and dia-
log act classification.
Recently, Carrell et al. [10] proposed an attack to leak sensi-
tive information in a transformed text, however, this attack only
works on a small dataset. The attack does not scale to large
datasets because it requires the attacker to perform annotation
of private tokens, which is costly and tedious.
3. Privacy
A general framework for protecting privacy is Differential Pri-
vacy (DP) introduced in [11]. DP quantifies to what extent pri-
vacy in statistical queries is preserved while extracting useful
information from a dataset and has received increasing attention
recently as a rigorous privacy methodology. In this section, we
clarify the connection between DP and text replacement meth-
ods but first provide some technical background on general DP.
Let D be the set of all possible datasets for a given domain
of data points. A key concept in DP is neighboring datasets.
We call two datasets D1, D2 ∈ D neighboring if they are the
same except for one data point. For example, D1 and D2 could
be two text corpora which differ only in one single word. The
intuition behind differential privacy, as defined below, is a guar-
antee that a randomized algorithm behaves similarly on simi-
lar input datasets to a point where the output of the algorithm
does not allow to infer which dataset was used with any relevant
degree of certainty. Therefore, an attacker cannot tell whether
the aforementioned data point is contained in the algorithm’s
dataset or not.
Definition. (Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm
M is (ε, δ) private with domain D if for all measurable sets
S ∈ Range(M) and for all neighboring datasets D1 and D2
differing in at most one data point, we have
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp (ε) Pr[M(D2) ∈ S] + δ (1)
Intuitively, a (ε, δ) differential private mechanism guarantees
that the absolute value of privacy leakage will be bounded by ε
with probability at least 1− δ for adjacent datasets. The higher
the value of ε, the higher the chance of data re-identification.
Algorithm: Probabilistic Text De-identification
Input: dataset D, token replacement policy pi,
probability parameter p.
for t′ in sensitive data do
r ∼ U(0, 1) if r ≤ p then
replace t′ with t ∼ pi(t|t′)
end
end
To define a general algorithm for de-identification, let T
denote the vocabulary of private tokens and consider a token
replacement policy pi : T −→ T , where pi(t|t′) is the proba-
bility of replacing t′ in the original text with t. We introduce a
parameter p to model the probability that a token gets replaced:
Lemma. If token replacement policy pi in the algorithm is in-
dependent of the token to replace, i.e. pi(t|t′) = pi(t), the algo-
rithm is (ε, 0) differentially private with:
ε = max
t
log
1− p+ p pi(t)
p pi(t)
. (2)
To prove it, we consider two neighboring datasets D1 and
D2, which are the same except in one token. In other words,
D2 can be obtained fromD1 by replacing a token t1 inD1 with
t2. Using this notation, we may compute the privacy loss as
follows. Let
ε = log
Pr[t ∈M(D1)]
Pr[t ∈M(D2)] (3)
where M(D) is the dataset obtained by applying the de-
identification algorithm to the original dataset D, and t is the
observed token in the resulting text. If t1 and t2 are not equal
to t (i.e., t1 and t2 are replaced by t), we have :
Pr[t ∈M(D1)]
Pr[t ∈M(D2)] =
p pi(t|t1)
p pi(t|t2) = 1 (4)
where we have used this fact that replacement policies are inde-
pendent of the original tokens. On the other hand, if t is equal
to t1, we arrive at the following expression for the privacy loss:
Pr[t ∈M(D1)]
Pr[t ∈M(D2)] =
1− p+ p pi(t)
p pi(t)
. (5)
We get the inverse of this expression in the opposite case
t = t2. The overall privacy bound is given by the maximum of
(4) and (5) over the private tokens as stated in (2).
The algorithm is a variant of randomized response [12]
whose connection to differential privacy has been studied be-
fore (e.g. [2, 12, 13]), although not in the context of text de-
identification. The probability parameter p gives data curators
fine-grained control over the privacy-utility trade-off: an ideal
text replacement, corresponding to p = 1, has zero privacy loss
( = 0) but in cases where the replacement noise harms the per-
formance of models trained on the resulting data too much, the
curator might choose to use a lower probability p if reduced pri-
vacy is deemed acceptable. Our lemma allows to quantify this
effect and compare different de-identification options.
In practice, p = 1 cannot be achieved very easily if the
sensitive tokens are identified automatically as in e.g. [1]’s and
our own experiments below. Instead, the recall value of the
employed identification method defines an upper bound for p,
e.g., a recall value of 0.8 implies that an expected 20% of the
sensitive tokens will not be replaced. As p approaches 0, the 
value approaches infinity, meaning that no privacy is provided.
In order to interpret our result, we consider the case where
an attacker gets hold of the fully transformed data set. The
level of privacy expressed by the lemma refer to the possibility
of reversing the replacement in order to reconstruct the source
from a transformed sentence, which is difficult when the pri-
vacy loss is small. Context information might be helpful, but
in general, original tokens can only be guessed according to
their prior probabilities which we assume to be uniform in this
paper. However, the algorithm allows for certain sentences to
appear in the output untransformed, either because of the value
of the randomized response value r, or when the randomly cho-
sen replacement token happens to be identical to the source to-
ken. The privacy guarantee given by our lemma arises from
the fact that transformed and untransformed sentences are not
obviously distinguishable. In fact, the DP parameter,  can be
Table 1: Examples of the replacement strategies, using color
codes for PER , LOC , ORG , and TIME .
Replacement
strategy
Transformed text
No Replacement Hi Mister Miller , the Lufthansa flight from
Frankfurt Airport to Rome is leaving by six pm
Redact Hi Mister IIIII , the IIIII flight from IIIII to IIIII is leav-
ing by IIIII
Typed-Placeholder Hi Mister PER , the ORG flight from LOC to LOC is
leaving by TIME
Named-Placeholder Hi Mister Smith , the SAP flight from London to
London is leaving by afternoon
Word by word Hi Mister John , the BOSCH flight from New Boston to
Berlin is leaving by eleven morning
Full entity Hi Mister John , the BOSCH flight from New York to
Berlin is leaving by twelve pm
seen as a measure of the certainty with which an attacker can
judge whether a sentence from the output was actually part of
the source text.
Referring to a specific instance of the above algorithm, i.e.
a fixed choice for p and pi (called a text replacement strategy),
with tokens being either single words or multi-word expres-
sions, we examine some straight-forward replacement strategies
and the level of privacy they present in the light of our results.
Redact Here, the private tokens are replaced with a non-word
placeholder that is typically not part of the vocabulary of the
source text e.g. IIIII . Hence, we only fall into case (4)
above, implying  = 0 under the interpretation outlined above:
an attacker can decide with certainty which of the tokens were
part of the original text but cannot infer the replaced tokens.
Typed placeholder (aka value-class membership [1]) This
is akin to using private category markers like LOCATION as
the replacement token. This is a strategy similar to redaction,
providing the same level of privacy. However, it provides addi-
tional information about a replaced token’s category and might
thus be more useful than redaction for certain NLP tasks.
Named placeholder A fixed category exemplar is used to re-
place all private tokens of that category [14], e.g, all locations
are replaced by “London”. This strategy makes it slightly more
difficult to judge which sentence was transformed and which
was not, i.e.  > 0. But for all instances that differ from the
exemplar, it is clear that they must have been part of the source.
Word-by-word replacement We can distinguish between
value distortion [1] if the replacement tokens are from an ex-
ternal source, and value dissociation [1] when the surrogate to-
kens are from the same corpus. The latter keeps the distribution
of tokens in the resulting document unchanged, which might be
relevant for some tasks. Both variants make it hard to identify
untransformed sentences, which is reflected in lower  values.
Full entity replacement Text coherence could be improved if
source tokens were consistently replaced by the same surro-
gates. However, this case is not supported by our lemma where
we require pi(t|t′) = pi(t). Another downside of the word-by-
word strategy is that multi-word expressions could lead to non-
sensical replacements, e.g. “Frankfurt Airport” could be trans-
formed to “New Francisco”. A variant is thus to replace full
entities instead of single words. In terms of what can be cap-
tured by our lemma, this does not lead to more privacy, but the
expected gain in coherence might benefit downstream tasks.
An example for each of these replacement strategies is given in
Table 1. Besides discussing privacy aspects, we have speculated
on the differences of the strategies on subsequent applications.
In order to verify these considerations, we now measure the im-
pact of the different replacement strategies empirically.
4. Utility
We experiment with three common NLP tasks, Named Entity
Recognition (NER), Intent Detection (ID), and Dialog Act Clas-
sification (DAC), across six different datasets (see Table 3). The
variety in datasets is important since what is considered sensi-
tive information is typically domain-dependent. Here, we con-
sider as private: (1) the identity of one or both speakers, (2)
organizations, such as e.g., company names, etc. (3) The lo-
cations or addresses (4) The dates and times. This private in-
formation coincides with typical named entities (NEs) and slot
classes in dialog datasets such as PER (personal names), ORG
(organization), LOC (location), DATE and TIME.
4.1. Datasets
The VERBMOBIL corpus is a large collection of spontaneous
telephone conversations [15]. In each conversation, two speak-
ers negotiate the details of a business meeting. The corpus con-
tains English, German, and Japanese conversations, however,
we only use English portion of the corpus for our experiments.
The VERBMOBIL corpus does not come pre-annotated with NE
classes. About 20% of the VERBMOBIL corpus was thus an-
notated via crowd sourcing. The remaining 80% of the corpus
was annotated automatically using spaCy2 and post-corrected
manually.
The ATIS [16] corpus is a popular dataset for slot filling and
intent detection tasks in the Air Travel Information Services do-
main. For the text transformation experiments, we map the pro-
vided slot labels to the aforementioned named entity categories.
SNIPS is another popular benchmark dataset for slot fill-
ing and intent detection task by SNIPS.AI [17]. The dataset
consists of seven intents from different domains such as “Ad-
dToPlaylist”, “BookRestaurant”, “GetWeather”, “RateBook”.
FB en-TOD is a multilingual slot and intent classification
dataset recently released by Facebook [18]. It consists of ut-
terances from three languages (English, Spanish, and Thai) and
three domains (Alarm, Reminder, and Weather). In this paper,
we only use the English dataset.
MS Taxi and MS Restaurant are two out of three dialog
challenge datasets released by Microsoft at the SLT 2018 work-
shop [19] for taxi bookings and restaurant reservations with 19
and 29 slot types respectively and 11 dialog acts. The number
of classes for the Taxi and Restaurant datasets are 18 and 24
respectively after removing classes with less than 40 utterances.
4.2. Experiments
For all comparison experiments, we first run a baseline exper-
iment using the original datasets. Then, we apply the respec-
tive privacy strategies to the training data before fine-tuning a
BERT model for token/sentence classification. We then com-
pare the performance of the resulting models with the baseline
with respect to the (untransformed) test set. The BERT classifi-
cation model involves fine-tuning the pre-trained BERT embed-
dings on the training data with an additional linear layer whose
weights are randomly initialized. We trained all the parameters
of the model end-to-end, including the linear layer.
For the implementation, we fine-tuned BERT on the var-
ious tasks using the simpletransformers3 based on the trans-
2https://spacy.io
3https://github.com/ThilinaRajapakse/simpletransformers
Table 2: Evaluation of the different token replacement strategies on the 6 datasets comprising of 3 tasks: NER, ID, DAC. Average
performance computed from ten runs. The best Accuracy/F1-score in each class/task are in bold and the best text transformation result
have asterisk (*). The replacement strategies use ground-truth annotations for the identification of sensitive tokens, i.e. p = 1, ε = 0.
Replacement strategy VerbMobil NER
F1-score
ATIS ID
Accuracy
SNIPS ID
Accuracy
en-TOD ID
Accuracy
Restaurant DAC
Accuracy
Taxi DAC
Accuracy
No replacement 88.3± 0.2 98.4± 0.2 98.0± 0.2 99.4± 0.0 78.9± 0.1 90.0± 0.1
Redact 0.2± 0.2 94.8± 0.2 89.7± 0.8 97.4± 0.6 75.9± 0.3 88.1± 0.2
Typed-Placeholder 0.0± 0.0 95.7± 0.3 54.1± 3.8 97.2± 0.7 76.5± 0.2 87.9± 0.5
Named Placeholder 13.5± 1.4 95.9± 0.3 76.2± 2.9 98.2± 0.1 77.3± 0.2 89.3± 0.1
Word-by-Word 72.6± 0.3 98.6± 0.2∗ 97.5± 0.3∗ 99.2± 0.1∗ 78.4± 0.2 89.9± 0.2∗
Full Entity 85.9± 0.3∗ 98.5± 0.2∗ 97.4± 0.3∗ 99.2± 0.1∗ 78.5± 0.1∗ 89.9± 0.1∗
Table 3: Dataset summary for three different tasks: Named En-
tity Recognition (NER), Intent Detection (ID), and Dialog Act
Classification (DAC)
Dataset Task Private Classes Train / Val. / Test
Tokens Sentences
VerbMobil NER 5 NEs 6 19K / 2848 / 5230
ATIS ID 21 slots 21 4478 / 500 / 893
SNIPS ID 39 slots 7 13K / 700 / 700
FB en-TOD ID 15 slots 12 30K / 4181 / 8621
MS Restaurant DAC 21 slots 24 20K / 2936 / 5859
MS Taxi DAC 10 slots 18 16K / 2273 / 4597
formers library of HuggingFace [20]. The hyper-parameters of
the model are 768-dimensional embedding layer (for bert-base-
cased model), batch size of 8 for NER and 16 for other tasks,
maximum learning rate of 0.00005, maximum sequence length
is 128 for NER and 64 for other tasks. The maximum number
of epochs for all experiments is 3.
Figure 1: Connection between DP (privacy), Replacement
probability p, and F1-score (performance) on VERBMOBIL.
4.3. Results
We show that the performance of the redact and word-by-word
replacement strategies can be improved by tuning the parameter
p described in Section 3. For example, by setting p = 0.9
(i.e.  = 6.75), we can improve the F1-score by around 4%
for word-by-word and 60% for redact as shown in Figure 1,
demonstrating the ability to control the privacy-utility trade-off.
In the word-by-word replacement experiments, we replace a NE
word t′ by another word t of the same entity class based on their
relative frequency distribution pi(t) in the corpus.
The baseline to which we compare all other experiments is
simply trained on the original training set, i.e., without remov-
ing any private information. On the test set, the resulting model
yields a prediction F1-score/Accuracy of 88.3% (NER), 98.4%
(ATIS intent) and 98.0% (SNIPS intent), 99.4% (en-TOD in-
tent), 78.9% (Restaurant DAC) and 90.0% (Taxi DAC).
Table 2 shows the result for the different text transforma-
tion strategies. Replacing private tokens using redact, typed
placeholder and named placeholder strategies generally gave
a worse result than the word-by-word replacement. For NER,
we observe a substantial drop in performance for redact and
placeholder approaches because the model overfits on the re-
placement tokens which are expected to be absent in the test
set. On the other hand, the drop is minimal for intent and dialog
act classification tasks around (2 − 4%) similar to the obser-
vation in [1], except for the SNIPS dataset with much larger
reduction in performance of 8 − 44% depending on the place-
holder strategy. This shows that these transformation strategies
are generally not suitable for training NLU systems.
For the word-by-word replacement, we observe a drop of
15% in F1-score when we replace all words labeled as named
entities with tokens of the same-type. For NER, we find that
“TIME”, “ORG” and “DATE” are most affected by the word-
by-word replacement in terms of drop in F1-score because many
of them are multi-word expressions. Thus, the three named en-
tities gain the most by full-entity replacement. On the other-
hand, the drop is very small (< 1%) for other intent and dialog
act classification.
Table 1 illustrates an example of the full-entity replacement
(e.g “Frankfurt Airport” is replaced by “New York”). This ap-
proach gives the best performance out of all the transformation
strategies with only 2.4% drop for NER. Interestingly, there is
no significant difference between its performance and the base-
line on the intent and dialog act classification tasks across the
datasets. In summary, the text obtained using the word-by-word
or full-entity text transformation are more suitable for training
NLU systems while protecting the privacy of users.
5. Conclusion
Replacing sensitive tokens with benign alternatives is a com-
mon method for de-identifying text documents. We prove that
privacy guarantees for a formalized version of this process can
be expressed in terms of Differential Privacy. Our approach in-
cludes two parameters, p and pi that allow different replacement
strategies to be expressed as instances of the same algorithm.
The respective DP- value follows from the choices for p and
pi, permitting a comparison of different replacement strategies
with respect to their privacy implications.
User privacy is juxtaposed by the performance impact that
a text transformation has on subsequent machine learning tasks.
We experiment with three different NLP tasks across six dif-
ferent datasets and find that both word-by-word and full en-
tity replacement strategies are robust against performance drops
across all examined tasks.
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